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Abstract Due to their non-hierarchical structure, socio-technical networks are
prone to the occurrence of the problem of many hands. In the present paper an
approach is introduced in which people’s opinions on responsibility are empirically
traced. The approach is based on the Rawlsian concept of Wide Reﬂective Equi-
librium (WRE) in which people’s considered judgments on a case are reﬂectively
weighed against moral principles and background theories, ideally leading to a state
of equilibrium. Application of the method to a hypothetical case with an artiﬁcially
constructed network showed that it is possible to uncover the relevant data to assess
a consensus amongst people in terms of their individual WRE. It appeared that the
moral background theories people endorse are not predictive for their actual dis-
tribution of responsibilities but that they indicate ways of reasoning and justifying
outcomes. Two ways of ascribing responsibilities were discerned, corresponding to
two requirements of a desirable responsibility distribution: fairness and complete-
ness. Applying the method triggered learning effects, both with regard to conceptual
clariﬁcation and moral considerations, and in the sense that it led to some con-
vergence of opinions. It is recommended to apply the method to a real engineering
case in order to see whether this approach leads to an overlapping consensus on a
responsibility distribution which is justiﬁable to all and in which no responsibilities
are left unfulﬁlled, therewith trying to contribute to the solution of the problem of
many hands.
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Technological research is increasingly carried out in networks of organizations with
different kinds of actors involved. These networks often lack a strict hierarchy and a
clear task division (Achrol 1997; Callon et al. 1992; Hakansson 1989; Halal 1994;
Rogers and Bozeman 2001; Saari and Miettinen 2001). Consequently, decisions are
subject to negotiation instead of top-down decision making. This increases the
likelihood of the problem of many hands, which is the difﬁculty, even in principle,
to identify the person responsible for some outcome (Bovens 1998; Thompson
1980). The occurrence of this problem in R&D is especially undesirable since
technologies can have negative consequences, risks and unforeseen side-effects as
well, often with high impact (e.g., the use of asbestos, CFCs, DDT, nuclear waste
and the greenhouse effect). These future consequences are often hard, if not
impossible, to predict with any accuracy beforehand and they often only materialize
during use (Swierstra and Jelsma 2006). Although originally formulated in a
backward-looking sense (i.e., in the sense of responsibility for an outcome that has
occurred), the problem of many hands manifests itself in a forward-looking sense as
well.
1 The problem then refers to the difﬁculty of apportioning tasks: which person
should see to it that something is brought about or prevented from happening.
In literature, responsibility is often discussed in terms of certain conditions that
have to be met before we can ascribe responsibility to someone. Typical conditions
are intentionality, voluntariness, knowledge or foreseeability, causality, and
blameworthiness (Bovens 1998; Thompson 1980; Corlett 2001; Feinberg 1970;
Fischer and Ravizza 1993; May and Hoffman 1991). These conditions are based on
the classical notion of individual responsibility. In a collective setting these
conditions are difﬁcult to meet. Engineers work in a complex organizational setting,
often constrained by market demands, which limits their individual power to act
differently. Moreover, since different people contribute it is hard to connect a
certain outcome causally to the actions of individual actors (Swierstra and Jelsma
2006). The unforeseeability of future consequences of newly developed technol-
ogies complicates these requirements even further. The combination of the
collective setting in which technologies are being developed and the unforesee-
ability of their consequences make it highly unlikely that for every outcome
someone can reasonably be held responsible.
One of the reasons for the occurrence of the problem of many hands is the
existence of different background theories with respect to the notion of responsi-
bility and, hence, with respect to the allocation of responsibilities (Van de Poel and
Zwart, forthcoming). Having different moral background theories, people will have
different reasons for ascribing responsibility to someone which ultimately leads to a
different allocation of responsibilities. This suggests that, if people are able to
reﬂect on these background theories and principles, learning processes can be
triggered which in their turn may contribute to a consensus on the allocation of
responsibility (Van de Poel and Zwart, forthcoming).
1 See Nihle ´n Fahlquist (2006) for a detailed elaboration of the difference between forward- and
backward-looking conceptions of responsibility.
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people’s notions of responsibility. The approach is based on the Rawlsian concept
of Wide Reﬂective Equilibrium (WRE). Using Rawls’ distinction between
different layers of morality I assessed the way people justify their moral opinions
(i.e. responsibility ascriptions) and what conditions they endorse for ascribing
responsibility. Since the traditional ascription of responsibility is guided by
considerations of fairness, I used the Rawlsian concept of WRE to assess the
distribution of responsibilities. If a distribution of responsibilities is part of an
overlapping consensus it can be considered fair. The main aim of the present
paper is to show how the empirical data necessary to assess a person’s reﬂective
equilibrium was retrieved. The working hypothesis of this paper is that an
interactive method, such as a session in a Group Decision Room (GDR), can
trigger learning processes which can ultimately lead to an overlapping consensus
on responsibility distributions and ideally also to a more efﬁcacious distribution of
responsibilities. The latter is important for addressing issues that are currently
overlooked by engineers during design.
The outline of the paper is as follows. Following this introduction I will brieﬂy
describe the Rawlsian approaches of WRE and overlapping consensus in section
‘‘Rawlsian approaches’’. In section ‘‘GDR session’’ I will describe how this
approach was applied to an artiﬁcially constructed network of actors involved in the
case of Gilbane Gold, a hypothetical case often used in ethics education for
engineering students (see the text box below for a description of the case).
Subsequently I will describe the results of the GDR session, followed by a
discussion. In the ﬁnal section conclusions are given, together with recommenda-
tions for further research. For reasons of readability the discussion of the different
participants’ WRE is presented in the appendix of this paper.
Rawlsian Approaches
The general idea of the present paper is to trace people’s opinions on how they
would distribute responsibilities in a certain case and to see whether these cohere
with the more general moral principles and background theories people endorse.
This coherence is important because it can provide a moral basis for distributing the
responsibilities. In other words, if a coherence is achieved, the distribution of
responsibilities can be rendered fair. We used the Rawlsian concept of Wide
Reﬂective Equilibrium (WRE), initially developed by Rawls (1999 [1971]) and
further elaborated by Daniels (1996, 1979), as the theoretical framework for
retrieving and analyzing these data.
In the concept of WRE a distinction is made between three levels of
considerations: (1) considered moral judgments about particular cases or situations,
(2) moral principles and (3) descriptive and normative (moral) background theories.
Reﬂective equilibrium refers to a state of coherence between one’s considered
judgments and moral principles concerning a certain case. According to Rawls,
everyday moral reﬂection takes place by examining our moral judgments on
particular matters (level 1) with more general or broader beliefs and principles on
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people move back and forth between these various beliefs and considerations, reﬂect
on them, revise them if necessary and try to achieve an acceptable coherence. The
end-point of this deliberative process is called narrow reﬂective equilibrium. This
narrow reﬂective equilibrium lacks justiﬁcatory power. It does not give a normative
answer to the question ‘what is right?’ but rather describes one’s personal moral
grammar, which can be typically utilitarian, Kantian or teleological. If we include
moral theories and other background theories in the process of critical reﬂection—
and let these also be open to revision—the reﬂective equilibrium or coherence that
is arrived at is called wide (hence, WRE). Contrary to the narrow reﬂective
equilibrium, WRE has justiﬁcatory power since it is the result of a searching process
of what is right. In the literature the term WRE can refer both the state of coherence
between these three layers of morality and to the process or method itself of arriving
at such an equilibrium.
Rawls used the concept of WRE in explicating and defending his theory of
justice in the context of political philosophy. He tried to develop a criterion of
justice that would be fair to all despite the diversity of moral frameworks people
endorse. In that sense WRE serves a justiﬁcatory purpose. In order to be justiﬁed,
the outcome of the deliberative process should be fairly achieved, to which end
Rawls introduced the so-called ‘original position’. In the original position
representatives of citizens are placed behind a veil of ignorance, depriving them
of information about the individuating characteristics of the citizens they represent,
in order to let them reﬂect upon and after deliberation agree upon principles of
justice that would be acceptable to all. Since the people do not know who they
represent, people would agree on principles of justice that are fair to all, Rawls
argued. As such the fair procedure guarantees the justness of the outcome; hence
Rawls’ conception of justice as fairness. In his early works Rawls tried to add
substantive content to his justice principles, viz. the right to equal basic liberties, the
right to fair equality of opportunity and the difference principle (which says that
inequalities are allowed only if they work to the beneﬁt of the worst-off group).
Recognizing the plurality of incompatible and irreconcilable moral frameworks
within a democratic society, Rawls later limited the idea of justice as fairness to a
purely procedural conception of justice. People with divergent moral doctrines will
most probably not agree on a substantive conception of justice but they can overlap
in their acceptance of a procedural conception of justice. For these procedural
principles to be justiﬁed they must cohere with each individual’s background
theories and considered judgments. Rawls introduced the term overlapping
consensus to refer to these justice principles that are agreed upon by all citizens
and that are part of each individual’s WRE. It is important to note that this
overlapping consensus is not a compromise or modus vivendi. Acceptance of the
justice principles must be for the right reasons, i.e. they must cohere with the other
convictions, beliefs and theories people hold and be part of each individual’s WRE.
Although this short description does not do justice to the richness of Rawls’
political theory, the key elements to be remembered for practical application of
Rawls’ approach are the following: (1) according to Rawls’ procedural conception
of justice/fairness something can be considered justiﬁed if it is the result of a fair
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2; (2)
‘being agreed upon’ means that it is part of each individual’s WRE; (3) WRE refers
to a state of coherence between one’s considered judgments, moral principles and
background theories, none of which is immune for revision in the deliberative
process of establishing an equilibrium.
The Rawlsian approach of WRE is particularly interesting because it seems to
provide a promising procedure for decision making in situations where people have
different moral frameworks, i.e., in situations where it is difﬁcult to arrive at
substantive agreement on moral issues. Conceived as a purely procedural theory, the
method allows for an objective criterion for decision making. The method does not
favor one moral theory over an other. In the deliberative process of getting at an
equilibrium, all three layers of beliefs (i.e., the considered judgments, the moral
principles and the background theories) are open for revision. Moreover, by
focusing on equilibrium people are encouraged to engage in a deliberative process
and as such the approach can be considered constructive as well.
GDR Session
To apply the Rawlsian approach of WRE a group of engineers, researchers and
policy makers was invited to reﬂect on the distribution of tasks and responsibilities
in the well-known engineering ethics case of Gilbane Gold (see the text box below
for a description of the case).
3 The participants were invited for a session in the
Group Decision Room (GDR), held on September 29, 2008. The GDR is a room
with electronic meeting support systems that allow for a participative approach to
complex tasks such as (anonymous) discussion, brainstorming, voting et cetera.
Selection of the Participants
In the Gilbane Gold case some typical roles can be discerned. These are the role of
technical expert (David Jackson, Winslow Massin), policy maker (Lloyd Bremen),
manager (Frank Seeders, Phil Port, Diane Collins), consultant (Tom Richards) and
city water ofﬁcial (anonymous). The participants for the session were selected on
the basis of their function and roles in their own professional life. The group of
participants consisted of eight professionals in total:
• two technical experts (water treatment and ICT);
• one commercial consultant/manager;
• one representative of a water board, i.e. the body responsible for sewage
treatment in the Netherlands;
2 Since Rawls’ procedural conception of justice suggests that justice implies fairness the terms fair(ness)
and just(ice/ness) will be used interchangeably in the present paper.
3 Some scenes were cut from the movie because we found them biased against certain characters or
because they focused too much on the whistle-blowing issue, which was for our purpose less relevant. In
total less than four minutes were cut so the main story line was kept intact.
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in the Netherlands;
• two experts in the ﬁeld of public management and policy processes;
• one representative of the Royal Institute of Engineers in the Netherlands (KIVI/
NIRIA), who was involved in the establishment of the professional code for
engineers.
By selecting participants with different backgrounds it was attempted to broaden the
range of considerations and arguments used in the deliberative process. The
participants were not asked to represent a certain role or perspective.
Aim of the Session
The aim of the GDR session was twofold:
1. to see whether it is possible to uncover the empirical data required to assess an
agreement between participants in terms of the individual reﬂective equilibrium
of each participant, i.e. to assess whether the individual participant’s
distribution of responsibilities coheres with his background theories and
considered judgments (methodological objective);
2. to see whether an interactive session, such as a GDR session, triggers learning
effects, which may ultimately lead to the construction of an overlapping
consensus on an allocation of responsibilities (substantive objective).
Since the case concerned a hypothetical situation, it was not possible to come to a
ﬁnal responsibility distribution to be judged in terms of overlapping consensus. For
this, more specialized knowledge on the case was required, for example about the
testing and the role of other high-tech companies in the area. In that sense the
individual responsibility distributions had an a proviso character. So instead of
focusing on overlapping consensus the focus was on the individual WREs of the
participants and the extent to which the learning processes, triggered during the
GDR session, did contribute to the convergence of opinions.
Approach
To answer the ﬁrst question we have to look whether it is possible to uncover the
background theories, principles and considered judgments of the participants. The
considered judgements were traced during the GDR session itself, both in different
voting rounds and in the discussions. The moral background theories were traced by
asking the participants to ﬁll in the Ethical Position Questionnaire (EPQ) before the
session and to give a written justiﬁcation of the consensus achieved afterwards. The
EPQ is a psychometric scale, developed by Forsyth to measure ethical ideologies
(Forsyth 1980; Forsyth et al. 1988). These ideologies indicate the background
considerations underlying moral deliberation. Four different ideologies are distin-
guished in the EPQ along two dimensions. The ﬁrst dimension refers to the extent to
which the respondent rejects universal moral rules in favor of relativism. The
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pragmatic in their attitude toward the consequences of actions.
4
The EPQ is comprised of 20 statements, 10 representing universalism and 10
representing idealism. Nine-point scales are used to measure the extent to which
respondents agree or disagree with each statement. On the basis of the responses to
the statements respondents are classiﬁed into one of the four ideological categories,
as shown in Table 1.
The moral background theories assessed by way of the EPQ provide information
on the way of reasoning and of justifying ethical judgments. It is likely that these
moral background theories will not change during the GDR session.
5 However, it is
possible that certain judgments, principles and other background theories change.
Therefore, the participants were asked to give a written justiﬁcation afterwards and
to reﬂect on their changed opinions. This reﬂection would give a ﬁrst indication to
see whether learning had taken place.
Set-up of the Session
The session consisted of four phases:
1. Introduction to the GDR session and showing of the Gilbane Gold movie and
inventory of the relevant actors and responsibilities.
2. Distribution of responsibilities (DoR) by the individual participants amongst
different actors.
3. Philosophical intermezzo on responsibility: what conditions need to be fulﬁlled
before one can be held responsible.
4. Discussion on the basis of disagreements and (re-)distribution of responsibil-
ities by the individual participants.
As said above the participants were asked to ﬁll in the EPQ beforehand and to give a
written justiﬁcation afterwards. Figure 1 shows the results of the EPQ in terms of
4 The name of the two dimensions used in the EPQ are somewhat misleading. The term ‘relativism’, for
example, might suggest that participants who scored high on this dimension attributed the responsibilities
in a loose way where each shared some of the responsibility. The contrary was the case. It appeared that
the participants who scored high on the relativism dimension showed on average a more black-and-white
view on responsibility with very distinct responsibility ascriptions. Since the relativists reject universal
moral rules, this distinct view must be based on some other source, for example competence, task or
function. Particularism, the view that there are no overriding principles applicable in every case but that
moral judgments should be based on a case by case basis seems to be a more appropriate name for this
dimension [see Dancy (2004) and Hooker and Little (2000) for a defense of this view]. The other extreme
of this dimension is then universalism. In the remainder of the text I will use the name universalism to
refer to the relativism axis. A similar remark could be made for the idealism dimension. The name
idealism might misleadingly suggest that exceptionists and subjectivists are not driven by a vision of how
people should behave or how things should be arranged. Although there were no ‘subjectivists’ in the
group of participants, the exceptionist clearly showed that he was motivated by some ideal (in this case,
the ideal of efﬁcacy), from which a normative appeal can be derived.
5 Forsyth does not discuss this explicitly but he compares his own questionnaire with the stages of moral
maturity (Kohlberg 1976). He argues that no relation was found between his two dimensions (relativism
and idealism) and the stage of moral maturity, implying that the former dimensions are more or less
constant in time. In a later paper he suggests that young people’s moral philosophy may still be evolving
but he did not ﬁnd evidence for this in his data (Forsyth and Berger 1982).
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The mean of all participants was 6.0 on the idealism dimension and 4.9 on the
universalism dimension. The graph shows that most participants’ ethical position is
either ‘situationism’ or ‘exceptionism’. Two participants tend to the ‘absolutist’
position. None of the participants has a strong tendency towards the position of
‘subjectivism’.
1
3
5
7
9
13579
Universalism
I
d
e
a
l
i
s
m
ABSOLUTIST
EXCEPTIONIST SUBJECTIVIST
SITUATIONIST
Fig. 1 Ethical positions and EPQ scores of participants
Table 1 Taxonomy of ethical ideologies
Idealism Universalism
Low High
High Situationist
Rejects moral rules; advocates individualistic
analysis of each act in each situation;
relativistic
Absolutists
Assumes that the best possible outcome can
always be achieved by following moral
rules
Low Subjectivist
Appraisals based on personal values and
perspective rather than universal moral
principles; relativistic
Exceptionist
Moral absolutes guide judgments but
pragmatically open to exceptions to these
standards, utilitarian
Source: Forsyth (1980)
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In this section, the results of the GDR session are described. During the session it
was not explicitly aimed to create consensus among the participants. It was rather
attempted to trace the opinions of the participants on responsibility and the
distribution thereof. In line with the notion of responsibility elaborated by (Goodin
1995), the following deﬁnition of responsibility was given before the start of the
session: ‘‘if A is responsible for T then A should see to it that T is brought about.’’
This deﬁnition leaves room for someone else than A carrying out a certain task.
Being responsible, in that case, means monitoring or delegating the task. It was also
explicitly explained that the kind of responsibility concerned was a forward-looking
sense of responsibility ascriptions were related to the bringing about of future events
or preventing them from happening. The more blame-oriented backward-looking
ascriptions for responsibility were not explicitly taken into account. Moreover, it
was also emphasized that the discussion was about moral responsibility, as opposed
to legal notions of responsibility, which can go further than a person’s professional
task description. The discussions were recorded on audiotape.
Results Part 1: Introduction
As an introduction to the session and the electronic equipment the participants were
asked to brainstorm on the relevant actors and responsibilities. For both items a pre-
established list was given (marked with an asterisk *). The relevant actors and
responsibilities as identiﬁed by the participants are shown in Tables 2 and 3
respectively.
Table 2 Relevant actors (actors
marked with * were identiﬁed
before start of brainstorm
exercise; other actors followed
from brainstorm exercise)
Actors
David Jackson—Environmental Engineer Z-corp*
Tom Richards—Environmental Engineering Consultant*
Phil Port—Manager Environmental affairs Z-corp*
Frank Seeders—Engineering manager Z-corp*
Diane Collins—Vice-President and Plant Manager Z-corp*
Lloyd Bremen—former State Commissioner Environmental
Protection*
Media (replacing TV reporter Maria Renato)*
Professional organization (replacing Professor Emeritus Dr. Winslow
Massin)*
Local water treatment authority* (representatives of) Farmers’
Association
National Environmental Protection Agency
(US) State Environmental Protection Agency
Environmental activist group
Competitors of the local industry, who operate under less strict
regulation
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The participants were asked to ﬁll a two-dimensional matrix; the rows contain the
different actors and the columns contain the different responsibilities. They were
asked to assign each combination of actor-responsibility a number, indicating the
degree of responsibility (ranging from 0 ‘‘not responsible at all’’ to 4 ‘‘fully
responsible’’). Twelve of the combinations with the highest disagreements were
selected by the moderators during the session to be elaborated on by the
participants. Table 4 shows the result of these 12 combinations of actor-
responsibility. The numbers in the columns denote the number of participants
who assigned the particular level or responsibility, e.g., for the improvement of the
test methods, two participants thought David Jackson was not responsible at all,
none of the participants thought that he was barely responsible, one participant
thought he was partly responsible, three participants considered him to a large
extent responsible and two participants thought David was fully responsible for the
improvement of the test methods. This particular example already reveals a
substantial disagreement amongst the participants. The last column shows the
median of the voting results.
6
Table 3 Relevant
responsibilities (responsibilities
marked with * were identiﬁed
before start of brainstorm
exercise; other responsibilities
followed from brainstorm
exercise)
Responsibilities
(improving) Test methods*
(improving) Law (test methods; requirements)*
(monitoring) Waste water*
Determination of toxicity of sludge*
Informing local authorities about ﬂaws in test methods*
Informing press*
Informing farmers*
Monitoring soil quality
Monitoring crops
Developing new technologies for wastewater treatment
Plant production planning
Changing production methods
Good housekeeping in industrial processes
R&D for new environment friendly technologies production
technologies by Z-corp
Informing authorities about contamination/concentrations in sludge
Financing the improvement of water treatment
6 Since the voting is done on an ordinal scale, i.e. a scale in which the numbers indicate a rank number,
the commonly used statistical measures mean and standard deviation are statistically unsound. In ordinal
scales, the adequate measure to indicate the central tendency of the measured variable is the median. The
median is described as the middle number of a group of numbers that have been arranged in order by size.
In case of an even number, the median is the mean of the two middle numbers. In ordinal scales no
separate measure to indicate the statistical dispersion is available.
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The participants were asked to brainstorm on possible conditions for responsibility.
The participants were explicitly asked to give conditions which, taken together,
would ideally be sufﬁcient to ascribe responsibility to someone and which, taken
separately, would each be necessary as well. This resulted in a list of approximately
30 conditions/remarks. The participants were then given a short explanation of four
philosophical notions of responsibility as they are used in scholarly literature, viz.
freedom (no coercion, alternatives for action), knowledge (possibility to oversee the
consequences of one’s actions), inﬂuence or causality (the possibility to inﬂuence
the outcome) and intentionality (the ability to make rational choices and to make act
intentionally). After that the list was discussed and a shortlist of eight conditions
was established. Accordingly, the participants were asked to individually rank the
conditions from most important (1) to least important (8), with the opportunity to
leave out some conditions, which they considered not necessary.
The eight conditions identiﬁed are the following:
• Freedom: this condition was conceived in a broad sense. The participants argued
that freedom is often limited by physical and/or psychological boundaries. They
identiﬁed a number of potential obstacles for freedom: conﬂict with other
responsibilities,dependencyontheopennessandhonestyofotheractorsinvolved.
Oneoftheparticipantsarguedthatonecannotascriberesponsibilitytosomeone if
Table 4 Responsibility ascriptions in ﬁrst voting round
Degree of responsibility
a 0 1 2 3 4 Median
(improving) Test methods
David Jackson 2 0 1 3 2 3.0
Phil Port 4 0 0 2 2 1.5
Diane Collins 4 1 2 1 0 0.5
Tom Richards 4 1 1 2 0 0.5
Local water authority 1 1 3 1 2 2.0
Determination of toxicity of sludge
David Jackson 5 1 0 1 1 0.0
Informing local authorities about ﬂaws in test methods
Diane Collins 2 0 0 2 4 3.5
Competitors of the local industry, under less strict regulation 5 1 0 1 1 0.0
Informing farmers
Environmental Activist Group 1 2 1 2 2 2.5
Media 5 1 0 2 0 0.0
Good housekeeping in industrial processes
David Jackson 4 3 0 0 1 0.5
R&D for new environment friendly production of technologies by Z-corp
Tom Richards 4 1 0 2 1 3.0
a Numbers 0–4 indicate degree of responsibility: 0 = not responsible at all; 1 = barely responsible;
2 = partly responsible; 3 = to a large extent responsible; 4 = fully responsible
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learning’ can also be considered a kind of freedom.
• Competence: one cannot ascribe responsibility to someone who is not
competent, both in a professional sense as well as mentally. Related to the
latter is the requirement that one needs to have the ability to view the world in a
moral way, to make sense of responsibility in the ﬁrst place.
• Knowledge: by knowledge the participants meant that all relevant information is
known, including management information, insight in the boundary conditions
and other relevant (conﬂicting) responsibilities. In addition, one needs to know
that one’s actions matter.
• Opportunityforaction:thisconditionrefersto‘internal’driversorattributesofthe
person him/herself. The person shouldhave the right/power/possibility for action,
should have the mandate for action, knowledge of the efﬁcacy of one’s action,
absence of group pressure. Under this heading the participants also mentioned the
‘moral’ right and duty to action, viz. whistle-blowing and civil disobedience.
• Boundary conditions: where the previous condition can be conceived as an
‘internal’ condition, this condition more or less refers to ‘external’ conditions.
This condition, which is also related to the freedom condition but according to
the participant not completely overlapping, is the requirement that boundary
conditions are favorable. Examples of these boundary conditions are the
ﬁnancial possibilities, dependencies or contextuality, commitment by higher
management, support, trust, resources.
• Task: related to responsibility in a professional setting is the task responsibility.
One of the requirements is that there is clarity on the expectations.
• Commitment: this condition was added to denote that one cannot ascribe
responsibility to someone if that person is not involved in the project or network
under consideration. One of the participants phrased it this way: ‘‘One cannot
ascribe responsibility to someone if this has no repercussion on the person
himself. There should be a link between the action and the outcome. If someone
is responsible for something that is completely isolated from everything that
inﬂuences that person, something is created which is outside the system. Maybe,
this is not really a necessary condition but it is just not wise to do it. It wouldn’t be
credible.’’
7 Although there was some discussion on how to exactly formulate this
criterion most participants agreed that the person should at least be a stakeholder.
• No unfavorable consequences for oneself: during the brainstorm this condition
was mentioned as a possible condition. During the discussion most participants
rejected this as a necessary condition.
The conditions ‘freedom’, ‘competence’, ‘knowledge’, and ‘opportunity for action’
more or less resemble the traditional conditions mentioned in philosophical
literature (freedom, intentionality, knowledge, and inﬂuence or causality).
8
7 Quotation participant Z. Translation by author.
8 The condition of blameworthiness, i.e. the causally contributory action was in some way faulty in the
sense that the actor can be blamed for the contributory action, is sometimes included as well. Since the
present paper deals with forward-looking responsibility explicitly, this backward-looking condition of
blameworthiness is not included.
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participants gave all conditions a very speciﬁc interpretation. Hence, the ultimate
conditions were sufﬁciently distinct as to keep them all included.
Table 5 shows the aggregated results of the individual rankings, where the
numbers in the columns 2–8 indicate how many times that condition had the ranking
indicated in the upper row. The last column indicates the number of participants
who indicated this condition as a necessary condition for ascribing responsibility.
Hence, if a particular condition had eight votes this means that all participants
indicated this condition as a necessary condition. It is interesting to see that the four
conditions mentioned by all participants are exactly the four ‘traditional’ conditions
‘freedom’, ‘competence’, ‘knowledge’, and ‘opportunity for action’. The criteria
‘boundary conditions’ and ‘task’ were mentioned by six out of eight participants,
the criterion ‘commitment’ was mentioned by ﬁve out of eight participants, and the
criterion ‘no negative consequences’ by only two out of eight participants.
Results Part 4: (re)Distribution of for Responsibilities (Second Voting Round)
After the discussion on responsibility conditions the participants were asked to
discuss some of the most striking points of disagreement. Subsequently they were
asked to (re)distribute the responsibilities. The results of this second voting round
are shown in Table 6.
Discussion
As discussed previously the GDR session served a double purpose. The ﬁrst aim
was to see whether it was possible to assess the different layers of morality, i.e. the
considered judgments, moral principles and background theories of the participants.
The second aim was to see whether the WRE approach helped to construct a
distribution of responsibilities that is agree upon by all and that is both fair and
complete.
Table 5 Ranking responsibility conditions
Number of votes in each ranking Number of votes
Highest to lowest weight ranking 12345678
Knowledge 311300008
Competence 211030108
Freedom 202211008
Commitment 100101205
Opportunity for action 043100008
Boundary conditions 011112006
Task 010022106
No negative consequences 000000022
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To start with the ﬁrst objective, the responsibility conditions were conceived of as
moral principles and the distribution of responsibilities as considered judgments. It
was assumed that the ethical position that followed from the EPQ, gives an
indication of the third level of Rawls’ WRE (moral background theories).
9 The EPQ
was used for this because this questionnaire is explicitly aimed at explaining how
people’s ethical ideologies or positions, affect their way of reasoning and justifying
outcomes. To qualitatively assess the coherence between these layers, the arguments
the participants used during the discussion were also closely looked at and
compared with the more quantitative voting results of the session. For a detailed
discussion of the different participants’ WRE the reader is referred to the Appendix
at the end of this paper.
The discussion of the different participants’ (moral) background theories, moral
principles and considered judgments shows that it is possible to trace these three
Table 6 Responsibility ascriptions in second voting round
Degree of responsibility
a 0 1 2 3 4 Median
(improving) Test methods
David Jackson 3 2 2 1 0 1.0
Phil Port 1 1 4 1 1 2.0
Diane Collins 3 1 0 4 0 2.0
Tom Richards 6 1 1 0 0 0.0
Local water authority 2 2 2 1 1 1.5
Determination of toxicity of sludge
David Jackson 7 1 0 0 0 0.0
Informing local authorities about ﬂaws in test methods
Diane Collins 0 0 0 3 5 4.0
Competitors of the local industry, under less strict regulation 3 0 1 2 2 2.5
Informing farmers
Environmental Activist Group 0 2 3 3 0 2.0
Media 1 3 0 4 0 2.0
Good housekeeping in industrial processes
David Jackson 1 1 3 3 0 2.0
R&D for new environment friendly production of technologies by Z-corp
Tom Richards 5 2 0 1 0 0.0
a Numbers 0–4 indicate degree of responsibility: 0 = not responsible at all; 1 = barely responsible;
2 = partly responsible; 3 = to a large extent responsible; 4 = fully responsible
9 Although the ethical positions of the EPQ, being an indication of one’s moral background theories, do
not cover the whole set of background theories Rawls’ labeled as level 3 considerations—these include
both moral and other kinds of background theories—other theories, e.g. scientiﬁc background theories,
were deliberately left out because that would have required more detailed information on the case itself.
In fact, Rawls himself is also a bit ambiguous at this point. On the one hand he seems to include also more
general background theories in these level 3 considerations, but in the discussion on wide versus narrow
reﬂective equilibrium he focuses on the moral background theories only.
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123layers of morality. Although some philosophers doubt whether reﬂective equilib-
rium is something which could be established from a third-person point of view
(Musschenga 2005), the discussion of the data shows that it is possible to give a
plausible account of the coherence between the three layers.
In section ‘‘Results part 3: conditions for responsibility’’ it was already
mentioned the four conditions that were deemed necessary by all participants were
exactly the four conditions that are mentioned in philosophical literature. If we
compare these ‘traditional’ responsibility conditions with those that followed from
the participants’ brainstorm, it seems that the traditional conditions are less context-
speciﬁc. Especially the conditions ‘competence’ and ‘opportunity for action’, and to
some lesser extent the condition ‘freedom’ and ‘knowledge’, were phrased in a
rather abstract way, which did not so much focus on a person’s position within the
external world but more on certain characteristics or abilities of the person him or
herself. The remaining four conditions (‘boundary conditions’, ‘commitment’,
‘task’, ‘no unfavorable consequences for oneself’) on the contrary were more related
to the person’s position within the world. It is therefore interesting to see that the
participants who scored high on the universalism dimension (participants Z, Y and
S) gave a higher priority to these more ‘abstract conditions’ compared to the
participants who scored low on the universalism dimension. Competence, e.g., was
deemed the most or second most important condition for participants Z, Y and S,
whereas most participants who scored low on universalism (X, W, and U) ranked
this condition below typical contextual conditions like ‘commitment’ or ‘boundary
conditions’.
The results show that the participants’ ethical positions indicate a way of
reasoning, rather than that they predict certain judgments. The three different ethical
positions—there were no participants who adhered to the position ‘subjectivism’—
all seem to have a guiding question in the deliberation (see the Appendix for
details). For the absolutist this question is ‘how to make true the ideal world?’,
typical situationists are guided by the question ‘what is (morally) expected in this
context?’ and for exceptionists this question is ‘what is most effective?’. These
questions do not predict beforehand how the actual distribution of responsibilities of
those particular participants will look like. After all, different participants with a
similar ethical position do not necessarily agree on the responsibility distribution
beforehand, as can be seen in Table 6. This table shows the voting results of the
situationists only. If we compare Table 4 (results of all participants) with Table 7
(results of situationists only) it can be seen that both tables have a similar spreading.
However, although people with similar background theories differ in the actual
distribution of responsibilities, the kind of arguments they use and by which they
can be convinced show a striking similarity.
If we consider the allocation of responsibilities, there seem to be roughly two
ways to approach this. The ﬁrst is to start with the list of responsibilities and see
who should be responsible for that particular issue. This approach seems to start
from a requirement of, what we tentatively call completeness. The second is to start
with the actors and see what responsibility could be fairly or reasonably ascribed to
this particular actor. This approach is more consistent with the scholarly literature
on responsibility. Within the group of eight participants only two participants—Z
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on the responsibility conditions. Most of the other participants used the conditions
to show which actor should can be ascribed what responsibility. Only one
participant, W, emphasized both the fairness and the completeness of the
responsibility distribution. No systematic difference between the participants
emphasizing fairness and those emphasizing completeness could be found. Neither
was there any similarity between participant Z and X in terms of their ethical
position. In fact, they were positioned almost diagonally opposed (Z had a low score
on idealism and a high score on universalism, whereas and X had a high score on
idealism and a low score on universalism). As such the focus on either fairness or
completeness does not seem to be related to one’s moral background theory. This
result is somewhat surprising. Since people with a similar moral background theory
appear to justify outcomes in a similar way, one would expect that they are driven
by similar criteria for responsibility ascriptions as well. Further research is needed
to substantiate the relationship between moral background theory and criteria for
responsibility distributions.
Learning Effects Triggered During the GDR Session
The second objective of the session was to see whether an interactive session, of
which a GDR session is just one example, contributes to the construction of an
Table 7 Responsibility ascriptions in second voting round (situationists only)
Degree of responsibility
a 0 1 2 3 4 Median
(improving) Test methods
David Jackson 3 0 0 1 0 1.0
Phil Port 1 0 2 0 1 2.0
Diane Collins 3 0 0 1 0 2.0
Tom Richards 3 1 0 0 0 0.0
Local water authority 1 2 1 0 0 1.5
Determination of toxicity of sludge
David Jackson 4 0 0 0 0 0.0
Informing local authorities about ﬂaws in test methods
Diane Collins 0 0 0 1 3 4.0
Competitors of the local industry, under less strict regulation 2 0 1 0 1 2.5
Informing farmers
Environmental Activist Group 0 1 2 1 0 2.0
Media 1 2 0 1 0 2.0
Good housekeeping in industrial processes
David Jackson 1 0 2 1 0 2.0
R&D for new environment friendly production of technologies by Z-corp
Tom Richards 3 1 0 0 0 0.0
a Numbers 0–4 indicate degree of responsibility: 0 = not responsible at all; 1 = barely responsible;
2 = partly responsible; 3 = to a large extent responsible; 4 = fully responsible
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difﬁcult to discuss something like an end result. In a real engineering or R&D
situation, the GDR session will be one meeting in a whole process of cooperation.
The question will then be whether the GDR session will contribute to a division of
responsibility which is agreeable by all. In the present example it is not possible to
assess these long-term effects. Moreover, detailed knowledge on particular
circumstances was lacking. It is therefore not possible to examine whether there
is an overlapping consensus. It is possible, however, to see whether the session
triggers learning effects necessary for the construction of a Rawlsian consensus. In
order to be acceptable by all, people need to learn about each other opinions, be able
to look at things from an other perspective, etc. So the leading question is: did the
GDR session indeed trigger such learning effects and if so, did these learning effects
contribute to convergence in opinions?
To answer this question we must realize that there was a twofold intervention
during the GDR session. Not only were the participants asked to interact, they were
also informed by philosophical notions on responsibility. It is difﬁcult to separate
the effects of the two interventions. To see how the participants changed their
opinions it is interesting to take a look at David Jackson’s responsibility to improve
the test methods. In the ﬁrst round most participants said that David Jackson was
fully or to a large extent responsible (see second row in Table 2). Only two
participants ascribed no responsibility at all. However, between the two voting
rounds a signiﬁcant change in opinion is observed. In the second voting round most
participants ascribed none or only very little responsibility to David (see ﬁrst row in
Table 3). Only one participant ascribed David Jackson a high degree of
responsibility for improving the test methods. In Fig. 2 this shift is graphically
shown. The blue bars depict the number of votes in the ﬁrst round, whereas the red
bars depict the number of votes in the second round.
To get more insight in the learning effects triggered during the discussion it is
interesting to distinguish between ‘active discussants’ and participants who did not
contribute to the discussion. The latter were of course able to follow the
discussion, but since these participants did not actively engage in the discussion it
seems likely that the learning effects are also less pronounced. To see whether this
is indeed the case let us take a look again at David Jackson’s responsibility for
improving the test methods, but now at a more ﬁne-grained level. Of the eight
participants four actively engaged in discussion on this particular actor-respon-
sibility combination. If we divide the histogram in Fig. 2 in two parts, one for the
participants who actively discussed this topic and one for the participants who did
not, we have a preliminary indication of the effect of active engagement in the
discussion. The result is shown in Figs. 3 and 4. Figure 3 shows the same data as
Fig. 2 but then for the participants who engaged in discussion only, whereas
Fig. 4 shows these data for the participants who did not engage in the discussion.
Figure 3 shows a clear convergence between the ﬁrst and second voting round,
whereas this convergence less visible in Fig. 4. Hence the participants who
actively engaged in the discussion did, on average, show a more radical shift and
a stronger convergence compared to the participants who did not engage into the
discussion.
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Fig. 2 Responsibility ascription to David Jackson for improvement of the test methods
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Fig. 3 Responsibility ascriptions to David Jackson for improvement of the test methods (discussants
only)
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123The same procedure is followed for Diane Collins’ responsibility to inform the
local authorities about the ﬂaws in the test method. All participants actively engaged
in the discussion on this topic so no distinction can be made between active
discussants and participants who did not engage in the discussion. The voting results
for this particular combination of actor and responsibility are shown in Fig. 5. The
ﬁgure shows that the participants tended to increase the degree of responsibility
between the ﬁrst and second voting round. It can also be seen that the participants
tended to converge to a high level of responsibility for Diane Collins. One of the
participants who shifted the degree of responsibility from 0 (not responsible at all)
to 4 (fully responsible) explained that he increased the level of responsibility for the
higher management partly due to the discussion.
A number of participants mentioned that the session did not so much trigger
moral learning effects but served mainly an explanatory purpose. Shifts in opinion,
one of the participants argued, were mainly due to clariﬁcation of the terms. The
apparent lack of clarity in some of the responsibilities is partly due to the fact that
the case was a hypothetical case which might somewhat hamper clear task divisions.
Moreover, the discussions on the disagreements were done electronically and not
orally. In a real case the results of the electronic discussion could serve as a base for
further oral discussion. In that sense the learning effects are indeed an effect of the
case selected and the system used. However, it is striking that of the eight
participants, especially the ones who worked in the ﬁeld of water management were
most positive about the use of the session. They argued that the session was useful
Responsibility ascriptions by participants who did not engage in discussion
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123because it encouraged ‘‘to form an opinion and to look at the case from a different
perspective’’ and it made one ‘‘think what responsibility really is and what is
required to ascribe it to someone.’’ This suggests that part of the conceptual
clariﬁcation is not just an ‘artifact’ of the system used but part of actual learning.
Lack of clarity on the exact functions and roles of different actors in a network is not
only a result of the methodology followed, it is something which occurs in real life
as well. One of the participants did indeed argue that the session helped to form a
clearer picture of the whole chain of production and emission and that this helped
him to understand the differences in opinions on responsibilities. It is likely that in a
‘real case’, this overview of a whole chain is often lacking as well. In that sense the
conceptual clariﬁcation could be considered a genuine learning effect.
To come back to the question whether an interactive session leads to the
construction of an overlapping consensus we could tentatively say that the session
triggers learning effects, which are a sine qua non for genuine learning. Whether
these learning effects also lead to an overlapping consensus is something that needs
to be explored in further detail in a real case. The results so far seem to suggest that
participation in an interactive session in general may contribute to some
convergence on opinions, which holds even stronger if the participants actively
engage in the discussions. However, to say that an overlapping consensus will
ultimately be achieved is a much stronger claim. An overlapping consensus is only
justiﬁed if it is acceptable to all relevant actors, or if at least all their considerations,
including their personal objectives and agendas, are taken into account. In a
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123hypothetical case it is difﬁcult to include all these considerations. One could assess
whether the participants in a session reach a consensus on certain topics but it is not
possible to see whether this is a justiﬁed consensus. A consensus is only justiﬁed if it
really ﬁts within each individual’s WRE. Hence, consensus as a consequence of
groupthink cannot be considered a justiﬁed consensus. Moreover, most responsi-
bility ascriptions depend, at least partly, on contextual factors, e.g. prevailing
legislation, technical details. In a hypothetical case this kind of information is
lacking. For some issues the participants in the session could therefore only give a
proviso responsibility ascriptions, pending the contextual details.
Conclusions and Future Research
In this paper, I have described the results of an interactive session in which different
people’s opinions on responsibility were empirically traced. The Rawlsian concept
of WRE and overlapping consensus were used to analyze the results. The EPQ was
used to assess the people’s moral background theories. The responsibility conditions
were conceived as the moral principles and the distribution of responsibilities as
considered judgments.
Although a consensus was not reached, the session showed that it is possible to
uncover the relevant data to assess a consensus amongst people in terms of their
individual WRE. It appeared that the moral background theories people endorse are
not predictive for their actual distribution of responsibilities. The background
theories do, however, indicate ways of reasoning and justifying outcomes. The EPQ
proved to be a useful tool for assessing these background theories. Two ways of
ascribing responsibilities were distinguished, corresponding to two requirements of
a desirable responsibility distribution: fairness and completeness. People who focus
on the fairness criterion appeared to put more emphasis on the responsibility
conditions.
With regard to the more substantive aim of the project, the session triggered
learning effects. Although explanatory learning effects were dominant, moral
learning was observed as well. Especially between the people who actively engaged
in the discussion some convergence on opinions was observed. Whether these are
sufﬁcient for an overlapping consensus could not be established on the basis of this
hypothetical case.
In the present paper the WRE approach was applied to a more or less artiﬁcially
constructed network, where no real interests were at stake. The next step will be to
apply the method to a real engineering case. An interactive session as described in
the present paper can then be part of an embedded ethical research that is carried out
parallel to the technical research (Van der Burg 2009; Zwart et al. 2006). In such a
project, the role of the engineering ethicists could become one of helping to
elucidate issues that are otherwise overlooked. It should be investigated whether
such an approach is indeed feasible (in the sense that it is supported by the engineers
and that they are willing to cooperate) and whether it leads to an overlapping
consensus on a responsibility distribution which is justiﬁable to all and in which no
responsibilities are left unfulﬁlled. If this is the case the present approach can be
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together, therewith trying to contribute to the solution of the problem of many
hands.
Text box Gilbane Gold case
The videotape Gilbane Gold was originally prepared by the National Institute for Engineering Ethics for
the National Society of Professional Engineers as a case to be used in engineering ethics education.
Although the case primarily addresses the issue of whistle blowing, the case could also be considered
exemplifying problems in the distribution responsibilities.
The case takes place in the imaginary town of Gilbane. The dried sludge from the city’s wastewater
treatment plant has been used for over 75 years as a fertilizer. It is sold to local farmers under the name
of Gilbane Gold. Since the area of Gilbane accommodates several hightech ﬁrms, strict regulations were
enacted on the discharge of heavy metals (arsenic and lead) several years ago. These restrictions are ten
times more stringent than federal regulations. The limits are based on the concentration of the pollutants
in the discharge with no restrictions on the total quantity of contaminated material discharged. The ﬁrms
are responsible for supplying the city with discharge data based on a prescribed test method. These data
must be signed off for accuracy by an environmental engineer.
David Jackson is a junior environmental engineer working for Gilbane’s chip manufacturer ZCorp. David
is concerned about the company’s discharge since a newer, and more sensitive, test reveals that the ﬁrm
has occasionally been slightly exceeding the allowable emissions. However, this newer test is not
prescribed by the city. David Jackson proposes to talk to the city about the new test but the ﬁrm’s
management is against disclosing the test results. By disclosing the results to the city the company
would risk legal action and maybe even stricter regulation.
Some time later the company signs a contract which implies a ﬁve times higher production level and
accordingly, a ﬁve times higher discharge of arsenic and lead. Although the ﬁrm is strictly speaking still
within city regulations—after all, these were phrased in terms of concentration and not in terms of total
quantity—David decides to blow the whistle and inform a local TV newscaster on the plant’s discharge
levels.
In addition to David Jackson, several other characters play a role in the movie: Phil Port, manager in
charge of environmental affairs under whom David works; Frank Seeders, Engineering Manager; Tom
Richards, environmental engineering consultant ﬁred by Z-Corp; Winslow Massin, retired professor of
engineering; Diane Collins, vice-president of the local Z-Corp plant; Maria Renato, TV reporter from
Channel 13; and Lloyd Bremen, former state commissioner of environmental protection.
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Appendix: Discussion of the Participant’s Reﬂective Equilibriums
In this appendix the reﬂective equilibrium of each individual participant is
discussed. Since the moral background of the individual participants were not
considered as being open for revision these equilibriums should be considered
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123narrow. Only if the moral background theories would have been included in the
reﬂective process, the equilibrium could have been regarded as wide reﬂective
equilibrium.
The ﬁrst participant is participant Z,
10 who scored relatively high on the
universalism dimension (5.4)
11 and low on the idealism dimension (3.3) and who
could hence be considered an ‘exceptionist’. Exceptionists have a pragmatic stance.
They think that one is morally bound to act in a way that produces good
consequences. Z argued for ‘legal’ or more business-like models to distribute
responsibilities because these lead to ‘‘a system where local optimization (of the
employee in his position) has the desired effect of optimalization of the whole
company. This distribution does not necessarily have to ﬁt from a moral point of
view.’’ Without discussing into detail Z’s reasoning, it has an unmistakably
pragmatic character, which is in accordance with Z’s ethical position. In the
discussion Z rejected responsibility for the environmental activist group ‘‘because it
is difﬁcult to ascribe responsibility for groups of volunteers.’’ The same participant
rejected Tom Richard’s responsibility to carry out R&D for Z-corp ‘‘because he has
reasons to assume that they will not listen to him.’’ In terms of the responsibility
conditions participant Z argued that one of the prerequisites to ascribe responsibility
is that the person has the right, power and possibility for action. Hence, there is a
strong coherence between this participant’s background theories, moral principles
and considered judgments. As such we could prudently argue that this participant
has attained a reﬂective equilibrium.
A second example is participant Y. Y scored relatively high on both idealism (6)
and universalism (5.9), which positions him as an ‘absolutist’. According to
Forsyth’s classiﬁcation absolutists assume that the best possible outcome can always
be achieved by following moral rules. In the discussion on the responsibility
conditions Y argued for occupational safeguards for whistle-blowers, which
suggests that whistle-blowing is sometimes unavoidable in the ﬁrst place. This
was later conﬁrmed in the discussion on David Jackson’s role in ‘good
housekeeping in industrial processes’, where Y mentioned whistle-blowing as the
ultimate responsibility of David Jackson if his superiors would not take adequate
measures. The latter is a rather deontological position. For people who adhere to
ethical skepticism, for example, whistle-blowing is probably less often the preferred
solution.
In the comments Y made a difference between responsibility stemming from
formal tasks and a broader societal responsibility stemming from moral commit-
ment. Y argued that on the former kind of responsibility people will most likely
agree, whereas the latter is ‘‘more closely linked to a view on society where the ﬁrst
consideration is cooperation as such to solve socio-technical problems.’’ In the
discussion on the different actor-responsibility combinations Y made this distinction
between formal and broader responsibility a number of times. With regard to the
10 To anonimize the results all participants are indicated with a letter and a male possessive pronoun.
11 The score on the universalism dimension can be obtained by subtracting the score on the relativism
dimension from 10.
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formal sense, the task of environmental activists groups is to support the interests of
their members, and to inform and inﬂuence governments. However, if it contributes
to the efﬁcacy of their action to inform the farmers, I see no reason why this is not
their responsibility.’’ A similar argument was given in the discussion on the question
whether David Jackson is responsible for the determination of the toxicity of the
sludge where Y remarked that ‘‘in a narrow, formal sense, there is no responsibility
for the environmental engineer. But since an observing person in his function will
be curious about the results of the companies’ actions, he should at least know about
the results and report these to the higher management.’’
Y’s ‘broad’ conception of responsibility coheres with a high score on the
idealism dimension. Since idealism refers to the extent to which a person believes
that the right course of action always yields desirable outcomes, idealists are
probably less prone to make moral compromises. People with a low score on the
idealism dimension admit that the ‘right’ action yields some tolerable mix of
desirable and undesirable outcomes (Forsyth 1980, p. 176). The reference to broader
societal responsibilities reﬂects a vision where people transcend the level of
(formal) task assignment and exhibit a (pro-active) attitude to make true the ideal
world. As such Y’s background theories and considered judgments seem to be in
equilibrium. With regard to the moral principles the equilibrium is less clear. It is
somewhat surprising that Y included the condition ‘no unfavorable consequences
for oneself’ as a necessary condition for ascribing responsibility. The other opinions
of Y point at a more strict position, on the basis of which one would have expected
the occurrence or otherwise of unfavorable consequences to be less relevant.
However, in the discussion on this particular condition Y argued for protective
occupational measures, which seems to suggest that Y does not as much consider
the absence of unfavorable consequences to be a necessary condition for ascribing
responsibility but rather the presence of these protective measures a prerequisite in
occupational settings. The latter points to a broad conception of responsibility for
the employer, which is in coherence with the previous considerations. The four
conditions that were ranked by Y as the most important are the four conditions that
cohere with the traditional philosophical conditions. Compared to the additional
conditions which came out of the brainstorm session and which somehow seem to
focus on the particularity of responsibility ascriptions, the four traditional notions
are rather general or universal. Accordingly, Y’s way of prioritizing the
responsibility conditions seems to be in coherence with his high position on the
universalism dimension. All in all Y’s background theories, moral principles and
considered judgments show a reasonable equilibrium.
Let us look, as a third example, to participant X, whose score of 5.8 on the
idealism dimension and 2.0 on the universalism dimension, positions him as a typical
‘situationist’. According to Forsyth, situationists tend to distrust absolute moral
principles and argue instead that each situation must be examined individually. They
focus on contextual appropriateness, not the ‘good’ or the ‘right’ but the ‘ﬁtting’.
Each situation must be examined individually (Forsyth 1980, p. 176). For X, the
responsibility with the highest ranking is ‘commitment’. The second most important
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embeddedness of action. Especially the high ranking of the ‘commitment’ condition
is striking. For X this was the most important condition for holding someone
responsible. In the discussion of David Jackson’s responsibility for good house-
keeping in the industrial process X argued that ‘‘if he does not get support by higher
management, […] not much will happen. His subordinates will point at his superiors
and show no enthusiasm whatsoever [to improve the industrial processes].’’
Compared to the other participants, X also placed the ‘competency’ condition rather
high in the ranking of the conditions. In the discussion this emphasis on competency
was reﬂected in comments like ‘‘the development of tests/analytical methods is a
very specialized business for specialized bureaus/institutions’’ and ‘‘the development
and improvement of testing methods is not a responsibility of the company but for
some ‘Bureau of Standards’, possibly delegated to specialized industry.’’
In the attribution of responsibilities participant X was rather distinct. None of the
actors was given a level of ‘barely responsible’ and only few a level of ‘partly
responsible’ or ‘to a large extent responsible’. Compared to the other participants X
ascribed relatively often a level of ‘fully responsible’. With the emphasis on
especially the contextuality of responsibility and, to a lesser degree, the requirement
of competency, X’s background theories, moral principles and considered
judgments show a remarkable strong coherence.
Another typical situationist is participant W (score of 6.3 on the idealism
dimension and 3.4 on the universalism dimension). Similar to X, W gave the
‘commitment’ condition a relatively high ranking. It is therefore not surprising to
see similar arguments about, for example, David Jackson’s subordinate position
within Z-corp. Both argued that he cannot be held responsible for the overall
process because ‘‘he is just an engineer’’. However, contrary to X, W added that
David, being an environmental engineer, ‘‘should feel responsible for good
environmental management.’’ This broad conception of responsibility, with a focus
on responsible behavior and not merely task assignment, is similar to what we saw
in the discussion of Y’s considerations. In the discussion of the responsibility of the
press, W argued that although it is not the media’s responsibility to inform the
farmers, they should announce the news if the farmers know that Gilbane Gold is
polluted and they deliberately remain silent. A similar argument was given on Diane
Collin’s responsibility to improve the test methods, where W argued that although
Diane Collins is not responsible for ‘‘improvement of the test methods in the sense
of development of new ideas’’, as the vice-president she has ‘‘the responsibility to
put some budget in this direction.’’
A striking thing in W’s discussion on the improvement of the test methods is the
remark that the whole discussion ‘‘misses the point. There are test methods and they
show contamination; improving test methods seems to distract the attention from
this issue.’’ With this implicit call for active measures rather than looking for
responsibility conditions W seems to emphasize the completeness requirement of
the responsibility distribution more than the fairness requirement. The issue of
fairness did come up, however, in the justiﬁcation afterwards. W addressed the issue
of fairness when he explained that ‘‘in the discussion I felt conﬁrmed in employee’s
innocence, but with some moral responsibility nevertheless. […] I saw some
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more responsibility to them in the second round.’’
Summarizing, in the discussions and in the different voting rounds both the
relativistic tendency and the idealistic tendency were clearly visible. In the moral
principles high priority was given to the ‘commitment’ condition. Taken together,
participant W’s background theories, moral principles and considered judgments are
mutually consistent. As such we can conclude that W has attained reﬂective
equilibrium.
With a score of 4.9 on the idealism dimension and 5.8 on the universalism
dimension participant S’s ethical position is a mixture of absolutism and
exceptionism. S argued that ‘‘Z-corp should inform the authorities if they cannot
guarantee the quality of the water’’, which points at a rather ‘duty-oriented’ position.
In the justiﬁcation afterwards participant S mentioned that ‘‘through the discussion I
became more distinct in the assignment of responsibilities: not everyone a little bit
but appointing clear parties.’’ However, an analysis of the voting results of S
showed that the voting results between the ﬁrst and second voting round became not
as much more distinct, but were on average signiﬁcantly higher. The number of
actor-responsibility combinations for which S assigned a responsibility level equal
to 0 (i.e., ‘‘not responsible at all’’) or 1 (i.e., ‘‘barely responsible’’) reduced from 41
to 33. The number of actor-responsibility combinations with a level of responsibility
equal to 2 (i.e., ‘‘partly responsible’’) increased from 2 to 9. The number of actor-
responsibility combinations with a level of responsibility equal to 3 (i.e., ‘‘to a large
extent responsible’’) or 4 (i.e., ‘‘fully responsible’’) increased from 13 to 14. This
means that the shift in the voting results was mainly from a very low level of
responsibility to a moderate level of responsibility.
A recurrent issue in S’s contributions to the discussions is the responsibility to
offer certain quality. In the discussion on whose task it is to inform the authorities
on the contamination, S argued that ‘‘Z-corp should inform the authorities if they
cannot guarantee the quality of the outﬂow water.’’ In the discussion on the
responsibility of the customers of Gilbane Gold (i.e., the agricultural sector) Z
mentioned that ‘‘their role has somewhat disappeared in the discussion. They do
have a product responsibility though and they should not take everything for granted
that has been offered to them.’’ This seems to point to a notion of responsibility as a
‘professional duty’. In the ranking of the responsibility conditions this professional
viewpoint is exempliﬁed in the high priority given to the conditions ‘competency’,
‘knowledge’ and ‘task’. In S’ view these conditions seem to point to a duty: if one
has certain knowledge, a certain competency or is assigned a certain task, one has
the duty or obligation to take up one’s responsibility.
Although S does not have a very distinct position on the EPQ scales, there seems
to be a slight favor of idealism (as opposed to subjectivism), which means that S
tends to ‘‘assume that desirable consequences can, with the ‘right’ action, always be
obtained’’ and a somewhat stronger appraisal of universalism (as opposed to
situanionism), which means that S ‘‘tends to rely on universal moral rules’’ (Forsyth
1980, p. 175). This deontological tendency is in line with the conception of
responsibility as a duty. Hence, the background theories, moral principles and
considered judgments show a rather good coherence.
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average score on the universalism dimension (4.9), which positions T somewhere
between the positions of absolutism and situationism. Participant T referred to the
notion of task several times. In the discussions on the testing of the contamination in
the outﬂow of the Z-corp factory, for example, T argued that ‘‘if it is about methods
for measuring poisonous material in the waste water of the company, it is of course
the responsibility of the company itself, and so, at the highest level, of the
manager’’. In the justiﬁcation afterwards T mentioned that ‘‘discussion and
exchange of arguments did not so much change your opinion on who is responsible
for what but it mainly served to get a clear picture of the exact deﬁnition of tasks
and functions of the different actors involved. Distribution of responsibilities is
dependent on these.’’ Considering this focus on tasks, it is somewhat surprising that
T did not give a high priority to ‘task’ as a condition. The condition task was
included as a necessary condition, but it was low in the ranking.
The reasoning of participant V, with a score of 6.7 on the idealism dimension and
4.1 on the universalism dimension a typical situationist, shows a striking similarity
to that of participant T. Similar to T, V emphasized the role or task of actors. In the
ranking the ‘task’ condition is therefore also relatively high. However, for both T
and V this focus on task was combined with a particular idealistic view on
responsibility. The question ‘who is responsible?’ was coupled to the question ‘what
is the moral consequence of not carrying out that responsibility?’. For example, V
emphasized the responsibility of Z-corp to carry out measurements within the
factory since ‘‘concentrations should be measured where they are emitted.’’ The
reason why it is the company, and not the local authorities to carry out these
measurements, is that ‘‘if they would do so, it would give the management of the
ﬁrm an excuse not to accurately carry out the measurements and to deny the
problem as long as there is not an improved method available.’’ This suggests that
the denial of the problem by the company is a bad thing per se, and not so much
because of potential damage. After all, if the local authorities would have been
ascribed the responsibility to carry out the measurements and if they would carry out
this task satisfactorily, the denial of the problem by Z-corp would, for consequen-
tialist reasons, not be much of problem. After all, the local authorities will do the
testing and carry out adequate measures. Hence, for V denial of the problem by Z-
corp seems to be problematic for moral reasons. In the discussion on the role of the
environmental activists group T expressed a similar idealistic view. T argued that
‘‘it is maybe not their responsibility [to inform the farmers] in the sense that there
will be repercussions for them if they don’t do it, but it is something that is expected
of them.’’ With regard to Tom Richards’ role T argued that ‘‘he is responsible to
point out to others (the factory and if necessary the authorities) that the current
methods are not adequate’’, which is rather demanding compared to the opinions of
other participants. Both T and V seemed to be less prone to make moral
compromises, which is in accordance with the high score on idealism.
Summarizing, the contribution to the discussions and the voting results of
participant T and V are rather consistent with the high score on the idealism
dimension. Although T emphasized the importance of task assignment, professional
roles or tasks do not give an excuse for not taking up a responsibility in T’s
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question of responsibility from a duty-like perspective: given a certain role or task,
what is morally expected? Compared to participant T, participant V has a lower
score on the universalism dimension, which becomes apparent in the contextual
factors that are taken into account. In the discussion on Diane Collins’
responsibilities V assigned responsibility ‘‘only as far as she can know and
estimate’’. The environmental activists group’s responsibility to inform other is
directed towards the party ‘‘that has itself a responsibility and that has the power to
change things.’’ On the basis of the above, both T’s and V’s considerations show a
rather good coherence. They use similar arguments for distributing responsibilities.
The differences between them can be explained in terms of the diverging score on
the universalism dimension. Accordingly, we can conclude that they both have
attained a high degree of equilibrium.
Participant U, whose score of 6.1 on the idealism dimension and 3.6 on the
universalism dimension indicates a tendency towards situationism, also emphasized
the contextuality of responsibility. In order to be responsible one should have
insight in the boundary conditions and possible other related responsibilities, U
argued during the discussion on responsibility conditions. These ‘other’ responsi-
bilities frequently appeared in the discussion of the different actor-responsibility
combinations. In the discussion on Diane Collins’ responsibility for improvement of
the test methods, for example, U argued that Diane Collins ‘‘is only responsible if
she thinks that the current test methods undermine the company’s position’’, with
this pointing at Diane Collins’ responsibility as manager of a ﬁrm. Another example
of ‘contextuality’ was found in U’s discussion about the local water authority’s
responsibility for the improvement of the test methods. The local water authority, U
argued, is ‘‘only responsible to the extent that local circumstances should be taken
into account.’’
It seems that U’s opinion on responsibility is rather ‘task-driven’: Tom Richards,
for example, has no responsibility to carry out R&D for Z-corp, ‘‘other than by
explicit commission.’’ Phil Port has no responsibility for improving test methods; he
is ‘‘only responsible for compliance.’’ These examples show that U seemed to aim at
a rather clear task division, not one deﬁned in terms of broader societal
responsibilities. In his justiﬁcation/explanation afterwards participant U mentioned
that the discussion mainly served an explanatory purpose and that it helped to form
‘‘a workable deﬁnition of responsibility’’ (though he attributed this to the discussion
itself, not to the system used). Task was indeed one of the necessary conditions for
responsibility, in U’s ranking. In the discussion U seemed to emphasize the fairness
condition more than the completeness conditions. In stead of approaching the
different responsibilities from a perspective of ‘who should do this particular task’,
U seemed to approach it from the actor side ‘is it reasonable/fair to ascribe this
particular responsibility to this particular actor’. The former seems to point at
completeness, whereas the latter seems to point at fairness.
U’s low position on the universalism dimension, the ranking of the responsibility
conditions and the contribution to the discussions, show a rather high consistency.
Apparently, U has attained a signiﬁcant degree of equilibrium.
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